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We  conducted  a global study of the long-term issuer ratings of nonfinancial  firms from 
Standard and Poor's Ratings Services (S&P)  for the period 1998–2003.  Specifically, we 
focused on the solicited versus unsolicited ratings and sample-selection bias in the analysis. 
Unlike the literature, we  adopted  an improved method using Wooldridge’s instrumental-
variable approach to mitigate the concern of specification errors in Heckman’s model. We 
found that the probability of seeking a long-term issuer rating is positively related to the size 
and profitability of the firm, and negatively related to the growth opportunities and debt levels 
of the firm. The credit rating is positively related to the sovereign rating, size, and profitability 
of the issuer, and negatively related to the debt ratio of the issuer.  Consistent with the 
literature, we found sample-selection bias in credit ratings. Our findings suggest that the 
firms with solicited ratings seem to be more profitable, more liquid, and have lower leverage 
than the issuers with unsolicited ratings. After controlling for sample-selection bias and some 
key financial ratios, we found that unsolicited firms, on average, seem to have lower long-
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
To improve credit ratings quality and protect investors, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
of 2006 was enacted in the United States (US) (US Securities and Exchange Commission 
[SEC] 2009). In response to the requirements of this act, some new rules relating to the 
oversight of credit rating  agencies registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSROs) were recently adopted by the SEC  (SEC 2007).  One of the 
proposed rules attempts to prohibit the practice of issuing some unsolicited ratings (SEC 
2007). Specifically, SEC states that “it would be unfair, coercive, or abusive to issue an 
unsolicited credit rating and communicate with the issuer or obligor to induce or attempt to 
induce them to pay for the credit rating or another product or service of the NRSRO or its 
affiliates” (SEC 2007: 178). The practice of issuing unsolicited ratings by some NRSROs 
might have raised sufficiently serious public concerns (from issuers and/or investors) to draw 
the attention of major regulators like the SEC. 
These growing concerns and controversies might have been triggered by the observation 
that unsolicited credit ratings, on average, tend to be lower than the solicited ratings (see, for 
example, Poon 2003; Gan 2004; Shimoda and Kawai 2007; Fairchild, Flaherty, and Shin 
2009; and Poon, Lee, and Gup 2009). Some researchers asked whether unsolicited ratings 
were lower than they deserved. Some issuers with unsolicited ratings questioned whether 
they had been fairly treated by the rating agencies and whether the creditworthiness of these 
ratings was lower than those of the solicited ratings (Behr and Güttler 2008). Shimoda and 
Kawai (2007) found that the differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings were 
smaller than before,  but they believed that strong and deep-rooted concerns about the 
reliability of unsolicited ratings still remained among issuers. 
Amid increasing debate on the issue of unsolicited ratings, the SEC has recently made an 
attempt to seek more information from NRSROs on how they define “unsolicited credit 
ratings” and their practices, procedures, and methodologies (if any) with respect to these 
ratings (SEC 2007). The SEC defines an unsolicited rating as “one that is determined 
without the consent and/or payment of the obligor being rated or issuer, underwriter, or 
arranger of the securities being rated” (SEC 2008). 
Probably as a consequence of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act and the related 
subsequent rules, the three major global NRSROs—Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services 
(S&P), Moody’s Investors Service (hereafter Moody’s), and Fitch Ratings, Ltd. (hereafter 
Fitch)—have issued updated policy statements with respect to unsolicited ratings. 
Specifically, S&P declares that “this rating(s) was initiated by S&P. It may be based solely on 
publicly available information and may or may not involve the participation of the issuer’s 
management” (S&P 2007: 1). Moody’s states that “this (unsolicited) rating was initiated by 
Moody’s and was not requested by the issuer” (Moody’s 2006a: 1, 2006b: 1). Under Fitch’s 
policy, Fitch asserts that “the decision to issue these (unsolicited) ratings must meet the 
same standards for information and analysis as the decision to issue solicited credit ratings. 
Since 2001, Fitch has publicly disclosed such ratings as having been initiated by Fitch” (Fitch 
2007: 1–2).
1
In addition, the dispute over unsolicited ratings might become a discussion topic for bank 
regulators and supervisors worldwide in relation to the calculation of the minimum capital 
requirements of Basel II (Fitch 2006; Behr and Güttler 2008). Basel II (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2006) provides a framework for the international convergence of capital 
 In sum, credit ratings that are initiated and paid by issuers are called “solicited 
ratings,” and credit ratings that are not paid for by the issuing firm are called “unsolicited 
ratings.” We use these definitions throughout the paper. 
                                                 
1 In addition, Fitch has clarified a few misconceptions surrounding agency-initiated ratings in its recent publication 
Unsolicited Ratings and Basel II (Fitch 2006). 
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measurement and capital standards. Specifically, the First Pillar of Basel II suggests that the 
regulatory capital of banks should be based on risk-based assets and that banks can use 
eligible external credit assessment institutions, such as some global credit rating agencies, 
to determine their credit risk.  However, Basel II  allows each country's national bank 
supervisory authority to decide whether its country's banks can use unsolicited ratings in 
addition to solicited ratings in determining their credit risk in relation to regulatory capital 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006). This indirectly draws distinctions between 
the solicited and unsolicited ratings of eligible external credit assessment institutions and 
may put pressure on national bank regulators to make a decision on whether their banks can 
use unsolicited ratings in the same way as solicited ratings for capital adequacy purposes 
according to Basel II. 
This paper examines whether unsolicited credit ratings are lower than solicited ratings using 
a global sample of nonfinancial firms. Our study is related to Poon (2003), Poon and Firth 
(2005), and other literature, but is distinct in two aspects. First, we use a global sample of 
nonfinancial  firms.  Given the regulatory structure of financial firms, the financial 
characteristics that affect financial firms' decisions to seek credit ratings and credit rating 
levels are very different from  those affecting nonfinancial firms.  A  cross-country 
comprehensive study of nonfinancial firms can clarify the issue of solicited versus unsolicited 
credit ratings.  Our study also encompasses  a longer sample period than Poon (2003). 
Second, given that the decision to seek credit ratings and credit rating determination are 
endogenous in the rating process, the literature (e.g., Poon and Firth 2005) primarily uses 
Heckman’s  two-step method to account for the sample-selection bias.  Heckman’s 
procedures rely on a well-specified rating decision (i.e., the decision to seek credit ratings) 
equation in the first step. The credit rating literature, however, does not have a theoretical 
foundation in choosing specific financial characteristics to explain a firm’s decision to seek 
credit ratings. The decision on whether to include a particular financial characteristic seems 
to  depend on some conceptual arguments as well as on  data availability.  That is, 
specification errors may exist in Heckman’s procedures. To resolve this concern, we used 
Wooldridge’s (2002) instrumental-variable approach in our analysis.  Wooldridge (2002) 
shows that his instrumental-variable approach does not require a perfectly specified rating 
decision equation. Hence, our research method is an improvement over similar studies in the 
literature.  
We offer several interesting findings. First, the firms with unsolicited ratings, on average, are 
financially weaker than firms with solicited ratings—in  some  respects.  Second, there is 
indeed a sample-selection bias in credit ratings. That is, the decision to seek a credit rating 
is not independent of the determinants of credit rating levels. Third, after controlling for some 
key financial ratios and sample-selection bias, unsolicited ratings seem to be lower. Our 
results are consistent with the literature and they are robust to the full sample as well as to 
the Japan subsample. 
Section 2 presents the recent literature on unsolicited ratings. The research method used is 
described in Section 3 and the results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 includes our 
conclusions. 
 
2.  LITERATURE ON UNSOLICITED RATINGS 
Poon (2003) was the first author to empirically analyze unsolicited credit ratings, using S&P 
long-term credit ratings of 265 corporations in different industries across 15 countries from 
1998 to 2000.  Poon (2003) found significant self-selection bias in the rating decision. 
Unsolicited ratings were lower than solicited ratings, and profitability and sovereign credit 
risk were the two major factors in determining long-term corporate credit ratings. Byoun and 
Shin (2003) used the unsolicited and solicited ratings of non-US corporations between 1996 ADBI Working Paper 244    Poon and Chan 
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and 2002 to study the effects of solicited and unsolicited ratings on firm value. They found 
that stock prices fell after downgrades of unsolicited ratings and that there were positive 
market reactions to upgrade announcements. In contrast, for solicited ratings, they found 
only significant positive market reaction to upgrade announcements. 
Butler and Rodgers (2003) examined a sample of 360 corporate bond ratings of 153 
nonfinancial companies from Moody’s and S&P during 1997. Their results suggest that when 
relationships existed in the assignment of solicited ratings compared to unsolicited ratings, 
rating agencies relied less on publicly available “hard” information, and were better able to 
assess “soft” (or private) information about bond issuers. Using a similar methodology to 
Butler and Rodgers (2003), Gan (2004) distinguished unsolicited bond issues from solicited 
bond issues using the rating fees reported in the registration statement. Using a sample of 
S&P and Moody’s credit ratings assigned to 1,410 bond issues of 303 firms between 1994 
and 1998, Gan (2004) examined whether Moody’s and S&P used consistent standards in 
solicited and unsolicited issue ratings,  and empirically tested two hypotheses—the 
punishment hypothesis and the private information hypothesis. The results of Gan’s study 
showed that both agencies gave significantly lower ratings to unsolicited issues, but there 
was no significant difference between the performances of solicited and unsolicited groups. 
However, Gan (2004) believed that these rating agencies gave lower ratings to unsolicited 
issuers not as blackmail or punishment, but as a necessary adjustment for the difference in 
the true and unobserved quality, such as for private information. 
Poon and Firth (2005) used an international sample of 1,060 bank ratings from 82 countries 
during 2002 to analyze shadow ratings,
2
Using a comprehensive sample of the  issuer ratings of 460 commercial banks in 72 
countries from S&P  for the period 1998–2003,  and adopting an endogenous regime-
switching model, Poon, Lee, and Gup (2009) investigated whether solicitation mattered in 
bank credit ratings. They found that solicited ratings tended to be higher than unsolicited 
ratings.  Banks with solicited ratings tended to be larger, have  relatively  lower ratios of 
nonperforming  loans to gross loans, and have  higher returns on equity than unsolicited 
banks.  Their results indicated that the observed differences between solicited and 
unsolicited ratings could be explained by both the solicitation status and financial profiles of 
the banks. 
 which were based largely on public information, to 
shed light on the controversy surrounding unsolicited ratings. Their results indicated that 
shadow ratings were lower than nonshadow ratings and that banks that received shadow 
ratings were smaller and had weaker financial profiles than the other group. This suggests 
that bank size, profitability, asset quality, liquidity, and sovereign credit risk are important in 
determining bank ratings.  While Poon and Firth (2005) applied  Heckman’s two-step 
estimation method (Heckman  1979) to their estimation model of bank ratings, Van Roy 
(2006) conducted a study of the  credit ratings of Asian banks rated by Fitch,  using an 
endogenous switching regression model. He found that unsolicited ratings appeared to be 
lower than the solicited ratings after controlling for differences in observed bank 
characteristics,  mainly because they were based exclusively  on public information.  He 
suggested that unlike solicited ratings,  which incorporated both public and private 
information, unsolicited ratings tended to be more conservative as a consequence. 
Fairchild, Flaherty,  and Shin (2009) employed Moody’s solicited and unsolicited credit 
ratings, collected from a previous survey of Japanese firms, as their sample and came to 
similar conclusions to those of the authors of the previous studies using S&P ratings. That is, 
unsolicited ratings were still lower than solicited ratings even though firms with unsolicited 
ratings had provided Moody’s with some degree of inside information.  Comparing the 
                                                 
2 According to Fitch (2001: 1), “the use of the description ‘Shadow’ denotes that the Individual ratings is largely 
based on public information, albeit supplemented with additional information obtained from the rated entity.” 
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unsolicited ratings  given by  S&P  and Moody’s, the authors  did not find a  significant 
difference between the ratings assigned by the two rating agencies. They believed that firms 
with unsolicited ratings provided incomplete private information to rating agencies and that 
as a result their ratings were lower. 
Shimoda and Kawai (2007) conducted a thorough study of the recent credit rating gaps in 
Japan, using ratings from two Japan-based rating agencies (Japan Credit Rating Agency 
and Rating and Investment Information) and three global rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P, 
and Fitch). The two types of rating gaps that they investigated were: (i) differences between 
solicited and unsolicited ratings, and (ii) rating splits among different rating agencies. 
Focusing on the credit ratings of nonfinancial corporations in Japan, the authors found that 
unsolicited ratings were lower than solicited ratings, which was consistent with the results of 
other studies using international samples, but these differences seemed to be smaller than 
before.  They suggested that the disparity in the level of information available to rating 
agencies and cherry-picking actions by the issuers (similar to sample-selection bias) might 
have contributed to the differences in the ratings. 
Recently, Behr and Güttler  (2008) and Bannier, Behr,  and Güttler (2008) conducted 
empirical studies on the informational content of unsolicited ratings and the explanations for 
rating differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings, respectively. Behr and Güttler 
(2008) examined whether the stock market reacted to initial unsolicited ratings and changes 
in unsolicited ratings for a sample of firms rated by S&P from January 1996 to December 
2005. They found significant negative market reactions to these unsolicited rating actions. 
Hence, the authors believed that unsolicited ratings did convey new information to stock 
markets  as  S&P’s  unsolicited ratings were mainly based on public information.  Bannier, 
Behr, and Güttler (2008) attempted to explain why unsolicited ratings of non-US firms were 
lower than solicited ratings with adverse selection and strategic rating (e.g.,  agency 
conservatism or blackmailing) arguments, using a sample of S&P ratings data from January 
1996 to December 2006. The adverse selection hypothesis was not rejected for the full 
sample. Moreover, they found that the strategic rating explanation appeared to be important 
in the subsample of banks. 
  
3.  RESEARCH DESIGN: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The data sources, sample firms, S&P  corporate rating methodology, and research 
methodology used in this study are described in this section. 
 
3.1  Sample and Data 
We examined 830 corporations in 53 countries, excluding all financial institutions and banks, 
that had solicited or unsolicited credit ratings issued by S&P from 1998 to 2003. The sample 
used in this study consists of corporate issuers that meet the following two conditions. First, 
the corporate issuers must have had long-term issuer credit ratings (LTRs) in local currency 
provided by S&P for  every  January from 1998 to 2003.  According to S&P's  Corporate 
Ratings Criteria (2008), an “issuer credit rating” refers to “an opinion of the obligor’s overall 
capacity and willingness to meet its financial obligations as they come due—whether rated 
or not” (S&P 2008: 10). Second, the issuers must not only have had issuer credit ratings 
listed in the S&P Global Ratings Handbook, but also have had financial reports that included 
a Datastream security code provided by the Thomson Reuters Datastream database
3
                                                 
3 Available at 
 prior 
to each of the six rating dates. As a result of this two-step screening process, we found that 
http://online.thomsonreuters.com/datastream/. ADBI Working Paper 244    Poon and Chan 
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all unsolicited issuer ratings from nonfinancial  firms during our study period were from 
Japan.  
Specifically, the dependent variables  in the rating determinant equation of the two-step 
model are the LTRs assigned by S&P as of January 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 
2003, which are reported in the S&P Global Ratings Handbook in February of each of the 
above  years, respectively (S&P  1998a,  1999,  2000a,  2001,  2002,  2003).  Data for the 
financial variables of the sample issuers are from the financial reports of Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. Some of the financial ratios used in this study (see Table 1 for the complete list 
and descriptions) are ones that S&P may examine in determining LTRs (S&P Credit Training 
Services  2000; S&P 2008).  The financial ratios measure profitability, capital  or  debt 
structure, cash flow protection, liquidity, and firm size. As rating agencies usually examine 
the relevant financial variables for the previous three to five years, this study uses a similar 
approach.  For example, in the treatment effects model using Wooldridge’s instrumental 
variable method  (Wooldridge 2002), the three-year averages of the financial variables in 
1999, 2001, and 2002 (if available) were used as the independent variables to explain the 
January 2003 ratings. The same approach was applied to compute the three-year averages 
of financial variables of the other years. ADBI Working Paper 244    Poon and Chan 
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Table 1: List of Variables Used for Statistical Analyses 
Variable Code  Variable Name and Brief Explanation 
    Profitability 
  ROC*  return on capital (%) 
  OM  operating margin (%) 
  ROA  return on total assets (%) 
    Capital/Debt Structure 
  DTC  total debt to total capital & short-term debt (%) 
  DTA  total debt to total assets (%) 
  LDTC  long-term debt to total capital (%) 
    Cash Flow Protection 
  FFOTD*  funds from operations (FFO) to total debt 
  [FFO = operating income - income taxes + deprecation, depletion, and 
amortization + deferred taxes] 
  NCFCAPEX*  net cash flow (NCF) to capital expenditures 
  [NCF = FFO - dividend or: FFO - (preferred dividend + common stock dividend) 
NCF to capital expenditures = NCF / payments to fixed assets] 
    Financial Flexibility 
  SDTD  short-term debt to total debt (%) 
  CASHEQ  cash and equivalent (natural logarithm of cash and equivalent) 
     
    Liquidity 
  CR  current ratio 
  QUICK  quick ratio 
  CASH  cash ratio (cash and equivalents/current liabilities) 
    Size 
  TA  total assets (natural logarithm of book value of total assets) 
  SALES  total sales (natural logarithm of total sales) 
   Other Variables 
  DTEBITDA*  total debt to earnings before interest  and taxes plus depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) 
  MTB  market value to book value ratio 
  FIXTA  fixed assets to total assets ratio 
*Similar ratios are reported as “key ratios” in S&P (2008). 
Source: Authors’ summary. 
In addition, we used the book value of total assets to measure firm size. While S&P does not 
have a minimum size criterion for any given rating level, the company believes that size and 
ratings are correlated because size often provides a measure of diversification and/or affects 
competitive position. In particular, relative size helps determine market position, extent of 
diversification, and financial flexibility (S&P 2008). Poon and Firth (2005) and Poon, Lee, and 
Gup (2009) found that larger banks have more incentive to seek credit ratings and that they 
tend to have higher bank ratings. Because rating agencies consider sovereign credit risk to 
be important in assessing the credit standing of banks and corporations (S&P 1997, 1998b), 
S&P’s sovereign credit rating (SOV) is included in the rating determinant models to explain 
LTRs. 
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3.2  Standard and Poor’s Corporate Rating Methodology 
S&P  considers an issuer’s rating as an overall assessment of an issuer’s ability and 
willingness to meet all financial commitments in a timely manner. Its credit analysts study 
both quantifiable and nonquantifiable factors in determining LTRs. S&P's corporate rating 
methodology organizes the analysis  on a common framework evaluating each issuer's 
business risk and financial risk.  Country risk, industry factors, competitive position, and 
comparisons of profitability  and  peer group  underlie  its business risk assessment. 
Government risk tolerance and financial policies, accounting, cash flow adequacy, capital 
structure and asset protection, and liquidity and other short-term factors are the key aspects 
assessed by S&P  in determining  the financial risk of an issuer.  A preliminary overall 
company rating is derived from both the business risk rating and the financial risk rating 
(S&P Credit Training Services 2000; S&P 2008). 
Each of the factors used in its rating methodology is evaluated, but S&P claims that it does 
not have any predetermined weights for these factors and that the significance of specific 
aspects varies from situation to situation. In fact, S&P usually establishes a team of expert 
credit analysts to assess information pertinent to the rating. A rating committee of five to 
seven voting members  is always convened to assign a new issuer rating.  The rating 
committee receives financial statistics and comparative analysis in advance and then the 
lead analyst makes presentations  before the committee determines ratings (S&P  Credit 
Training Services 2000; S&P 2008). 
 
3.3  Univariate Tests 
As LTR is not a continuous variable and instead follows an ordinal scale, a nonparametric 
test—the Mann-Whitney U-test—is used to test the following null hypothesis (H1) in addition 
to the t-test (a parametric test). 
H1: Solicited and unsolicited issuer ratings have identical distributions. 
 
The alternative hypothesis to H1 is that there is a significant difference in the distribution of 
ratings between the two groups, which may imply that unsolicited ratings are, on average, 
lower or higher than solicited ratings. 
 
3.4  Univariate Tests of Differences in Financial Profiles 
Differences between the two groups of ratings may be attributable to differences in financial 
profiles and/or firm characteristics. T-tests and Mann-Whitney U-tests are conducted to test 
for differences in financial profiles and firm characteristics between firms with solicited and 
unsolicited ratings for both the overall sample and the Japanese subsample. 
H2: There is no difference between the financial profiles and firm characteristics of 
firms with solicited and unsolicited ratings. 
The alternative hypothesis to H2 is that there are significant differences between the 
financial profiles and firm characteristics of firms with solicited and unsolicited ratings. 
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3.5  Wooldridge’s Two-Step Treatment Effects Instrumental 
Variable Model 
Liu and Malatesta (2006) argued that a firm’s decision to seek a credit rating is mainly 
influenced by firm characteristics such as firm size, profitability, and tangible asset level.
4
Most previous studies applied Heckman’s (1979) two-step estimation method to account for 
sample-selection bias. The first step in the process is to estimate the selection equation to 
determine the probability that a firm will seek a credit rating. A sample-selection bias variable 
(called the inverse Mill’s ratio) is estimated in the process. The second step is to estimate 
the main equation to study the determinants of the credit rating levels by incorporating a set 
of explanatory variables and the inverse Mill’s ratio using a regression model. The challenge 
of applying Heckman’s procedure in the context of credit ratings is that the literature does 
not provide a theoretical foundation to incorporate specific contributing factors to the credit 
rating decisions in the rating decision equation. The decisions to include some variables are 
primarily based on some conceptual arguments or other practical reasons such as data 
availability. Therefore, the estimated inverse Mill’s ratio may change depending on the 
number of variables used in the selection equation. With a different Mill’s ratio, the second 
step in the Heckman procedure may yield different estimation results.  
 
Some of these characteristics, however, are also critical in determining the actual credit 
rating level of the firm. Hence, some of the characteristics that explain a firm’s decision to 
obtain a credit rating are not independent of the characteristics that determine the credit 
rating level of the same firm. A  financially weak (strong) firm might have less (more) 
incentive to seek a credit rating because the firm would expect to receive a low (high) credit 
rating level. Specifically, we need to mitigate the endogeneity of the firm's decision to seek a 
credit rating. Endogeneity occurs when the characteristics that affect a firm’s decision on 
obtaining a credit rating also determine its credit rating level (i.e., there is a sample-selection 
bias). The credit rating literature discusses such bias in detail (see Poon 2003; Poon and 
Firth 2005). 
To circumvent the concern of using Heckman’s procedure, we used Wooldridge’s (2002) 
two-step instrumental variable method to account for the sample-selection bias. Similar to 
Heckman’s method, Wooldridge’s instrumental-variable approach also uses a probit model 
to estimate the rating decision equation with a set of firm characteristics in the first step. 
Then, a fitted probability of seeking a credit rating (Y_hat) is obtained from the estimated 
probit equation for each firm. The fitted probability is then used as the instrumental variable 
to replace the dummy variable that measures the effect of a solicited  versus  unsolicited 
rating (Y) in the main equation. In the second step (i.e., estimating the main equation), the 
credit rating determinants are estimated using a set of explanatory variables and the fitted 
probability instrumental variable. Wooldridge (2002) showed that such an approach does not 
require a perfect specification of the selection equation. Thus, the concern of specification 
errors in the first step in Heckman’s method is mitigated.  Recent studies,  such as 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Lin and Su (2008), also use Wooldridge’s approach to 
deal with the endogenous selection issue. Using Wooldridge’s instrumental-variable method, 
we tested the following null hypothesis:  
H3: Corporate credit ratings do not reflect a selectivity bias. 
 
The alternative hypothesis to H3 is that a sample-selection bias exists in corporate credit 
ratings. The sample-selection bias may partially explain the downward bias of unsolicited 
ratings in comparison to solicited ratings. The two-step Wooldridge treatment effects model 
is illustrated below. 
                                                 
4 Faulkender and Petersen (2006) used a similar set of firm characteristics to model a firm’s 
decision to access the bond market. ADBI Working Paper 244    Poon and Chan 
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Step 1: Rating decision equation (selection equation based on a probit model) 
i i i Z Y ξ γ + =
∗   (1) 
The observed decision is   1 = i Y  if  0 >
∗
i Y  
  0 = i Y  if  0 ≤
∗
i Y  
Step 2: Rating determinant equation (main equation based on a regression model) 
i i i i Y X R ε δ β + + =   (2) 
where 
 
Ri  =  the observed rating category that is assigned to issuer i; 
Xi  =  a vector of explanatory variables for issuer i in the rating determinant 
equation; 
Yi  =  a binary variable representing whether an issuer has solicited or 
unsolicited ratings from S&P; 
Yi
*  =  an unobserved continuous latent variable for the selection decision; 
Zi  =  a vector of explanatory variables in the selection equation; 
β,δ , γ   =  a vector of coefficients or coefficient; 
i ε , i ξ   =  the random error terms that follow a bivariate normal distribution with 
zero mean and correlationρ εξ; and  
ρ εξ      =   the correlation between  i ε and i ξ . 
In Step 1, we estimated the rating decision with seven explanatory variables by probit. The 
explanatory variables of the probit model are: (1) TA = natural logarithm of total assets; (2) 
FIXTA = fixed asset to total assets ratio; (3) SOV = sovereign credit rating where AAA = 9, 
AA = 8, A = 7, BBB = 6, BB = 5, B= 4, CCC = 3, CC = 2, and SD/D = 1; (4) ROA = return on 
assets; (5) MTB = market-to-book ratio; (6) DTA = debt to total asset ratio; and (7) JAPAN = 
1 if the firm is based in Japan. We obtained a fitted probability of obtaining a credit rating for 
each firm in the estimation process.  The inclusion of some of these financial variables 
follows the work in Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Liu and Malatesta (2006), Poon and 
Firth (2005), and Poon, Lee, and Gup (2009). We expected that a firm would be more likely 
to seek a credit rating if it were larger, more profitable, and had more tangible assets.  
In  Step 2  (i.e., rating determinant equation), the dependent variable of the primary 
regression equation of interest is the S&P LTR, where AAA = 9, AA = 8, A = 7, BBB = 6, BB 
= 5, B= 4, CCC = 3, CC = 2, and SD/D = 1. The explanatory variables include: (1) TA, (2) 
SOV,  (3)  ROA,  (4)  DTA,  (5)  FFOTD  = funds from operations to total debt, (6) various 
industry dummy variables, (7) JAPAN, and (8) Y = 1 for a firm having solicited a credit rating 
in Step 1. A higher value for an explanatory variable (β) suggests a greater probability of a 
higher credit rating. Because of the sample-selection bias in the decision to seek a credit 
rating, we used Y_HAT (a fitted probability for the likelihood of a firm having a solicited credit 
rating in Step 1) as an instrumental variable to replace Y in Equation (2). The testing of the 
null hypothesis that δ = 0 was used as the test for selectivity bias (H3) and to test whether 
the solicited rating was higher than the unsolicited rating (H2).  
Multicollinearity in Equation (2) may be a concern because financial variables are highly 
correlated. Therefore, we selected only key financial variables representing the sovereign 
rating of the country where the firm is located, firm size, profitability, capital structure, and 
cash flow protection to explain credit rating levels.  We also included  industry  dummy 
variables to account for industry effects on credit rating levels.  
 ADBI Working Paper 244    Poon and Chan 
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4.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics of the sample, the comparison between the solicited and 
unsolicited groups, and the results from  the  treatment effects model using Wooldridge’s 
instrumental variable method are discussed in this section. 
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides a brief description of LTRs ranging from AAA to D. The table also lists the 
sample frequency and sample percentage of 3,392 observations across the nine rating 
levels and by solicited and unsolicited rating subgroups. Only 2.2% of the sample ratings (all 
from the solicited group) received AAA ratings, which indicates  that these  firms  are 
“extremely strong” according to S&P's definition. About 70% of the sample firms obtained a 
rating of BBB or above (labeled as investment-grade ratings hereafter), while about 30% of 
the sample obtained a rating of BB or below (labeled as speculative-grade ratings hereafter). 
In the overall sample, the majority of the issuers (82.2%) had solicited ratings from S&P, and 
17.8% had unsolicited ratings. Interestingly, while most of the solicited ratings (2,049 out of 
2,789 or 73%) are investment grade, only about half of the unsolicited ratings (318 out of 
603) are investment grade. ADBI Working Paper 244    Poon and Chan 
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Table 2: Rating Definitions and Distribution of Standard & Poor’s Long-Term Issuer Credit Ratings  




Frequency in the Sample 
(percentage in the sample)   
 






AAA  73  (2.2%)  0  (0.0%) 
Extremely strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. 
AA  319  (9.4%)  48  (1.4%)  Very strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. It differs from the highest rated 
issuers only by a small degree. 
A  752  (22.2%)  83  (2.4%)  Strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. 
BBB  *905  *(26.7%)  *187  *(5.5%)  Adequate capacity to meet its financial commitments. 
Subtotal of 
“BBB” or above 
ratings 
2049  (60.4%)  318  (9.4%)   (69.8%) 
BB  373  (11.0%)  174  (5.1%)  Less vulnerable in the near term than other lower-rated issuers. 
B  252  (7.4%)  94  (2.8%)  More vulnerable than the issuers rated BB, but the issuer currently has the capacity to 
meet its financial commitments. 
CCC  50  (1.5%)  7  (0.2%)  Currently formable 
CC  16  (0.5%)  5  (0.1%)  Currently highly vulnerable 
SD and D  49  (1.4%)  5  (0.1%) 
An “SD” (selective default) rating is assigned when S&P considers that the issuer has 
selectively defaulted on a specific issuer or class of obligations when it comes due. 
A “D” rating is assigned when S&P considers that the default will be a GENERAL 
DEFAULT, and that the issuer will fail to pay all or substantially all of its obligations as 
they come due. 
Subtotal of “BB” 
or below ratings  740  (21.8%)  285  (8.4%)   (30.2%) 
Total  2,789  (82.2%)  603  (17.8%)  (100.0%) 
Notes: * indicates the highest number or percentage in each column, excluding subtotals. 
1. All solicited ratings with + or - designations are grouped according to their corresponding letter grades. 
2. Percentage in the sample is in parentheses. 
3. Rating definitions are extracted from S&P (2003). 
Source: S&P (2003) and authors’ calculations. ADBI Working Paper 244    Poon and Chan 
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Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the distribution of 3,392 sample ratings from 53 countries during the 
study period from 1998 to 2003 sorted by country and by year, respectively. Japan had the 
highest number of ratings in the overall sample (23.5% of the overall sample) and all the 
unsolicited ratings of the sample. Canada had the highest number of solicited ratings (18.3% 
of the solicited subsample and 15.1% of the overall sample). Table 4 shows that there were 
increasing numbers of both solicited and unsolicited ratings during the study period. About 
22% of the sample ratings are from 2003. ADBI Working Paper 244    Poon and Chan 
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Table 3: Distribution of Sample Issuers by Country 
 
Country 
Frequency in the Sample 







1.  Argentina  43  (1.3%)  0  (0.0%)  43  (1.3%) 
2.  Australia  200  (5.9%)  0  (0.0%)  200  (5.9%) 
3.  Austria  8  (0.2%)  0  (0.0%)  8  (0.2%) 
4.  Belgium  8  (0.2%)  0  (0.0%)  8  (0.2%) 
5.  Bermuda  20  (0.6%)  0  (0.0%)  20  (0.6%) 
6.  Brazil  43  (1.3%)  0  (0.0%)  43  (1.3%) 
7.  Canada  *511  *(15.1%)  0  (0.0%)  511  (15.1%) 
8.  Cayman Islands  2  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  2  (0.1%) 
9.  Chile  70  (2.1%)  0  (0.0%)  70  (2.1%) 
10.  China, People's Rep. of  1  (0.0%)  0  (0.0%)  1  (0.0%) 
11.  Colombia  5  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  5  (0.1%) 
12.  Czech Republic  19  (0.6%)  0  (0.0%)  19  (0.6%) 
13.  Denmark  3  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  3  (0.1%) 
14.  Dominican Republic  6  (0.2%)  0  (0.0%)  6  (0.2%) 
15.  Egypt  3  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  3  (0.1%) 
16.  Finland  30  (0.9%)  0  (0.0%)  30  (0.9%) 
17.  France  166  (4.9%)  0  (0.0%)  166  (4.9%) 
18.  Germany  87  (2.6%)  0  (0.0%)  87  (2.6%) 
19.  Greece  10  (0.3%)  0  (0.0%)  10  (0.3%) 
20.  Hong Kong, China  54  (1.6%)  0  (0.0%)  54  (1.6%) 
21.  Hungary  3  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  3  (0.1%) 
22.  India  9  (0.3%)  0  (0.0%)  9  (0.3%) 
23.  Indonesia  38  (1.1%)  0  (0.0%)  38  (1.1%) 
24.  Ireland  13  (0.4%)  0  (0.0%)  13  (0.4%) 
25.  Israel  9  (0.3%)  0  (0.0%)  9  (0.3%) 
26.  Italy  24  (0.7%)  0  (0.0%)  24  (0.7%) 
27.  Japan  195  (5.7%)  *603  *(17.8%)  *798  *(23.5%) 
28.  Kazakhstan  1  (0.0%)  0  (0.0%)  1  (0.0%) 
29.  Korea, Rep. of  27  (0.8%)  0  (0.0%)  27  (0.8%) 
30.  Lithuania  5  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  5  (0.1%) 
31.  Luxembourg  5  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  5  (0.1%) 
32.  Malaysia  17  (0.5%)  0  (0.0%)  17  (0.5%) 
33.  Mexico  115  (3.4%)  0  (0.0%)  115  (3.4%) 
34.  Monaco  5  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  5  (0.1%) 
35.  Netherlands  89  (2.6%)  0  (0.0%)  89  (2.6%) 
36.  New Zealand  48  (1.4%)  0  (0.0%)  48  (1.4%) 
37.  Norway  27  (0.8%)  0  (0.0%)  27  (0.8%) 
38.  Peru  2  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  2  (0.1%) 
39.  Philippines  6  (0.2%)  0  (0.0%)  6  (0.2%) 
40.  Poland  14  (0.4%)  0  (0.0%)  14  (0.4%) 
41.  Portugal  16  (0.5%)  0  (0.0%)  16  (0.5%) 
42.  Russia  32  (0.9%)  0  (0.0%)  32  (0.9%) 
43.  Singapore  5  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  5  (0.1%) 
44.  South Africa  2  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  2  (0.1%) 
45.  Spain  45  (1.3%)  0  (0.0%)  45  (1.3%) 
46.  Sweden  70  (2.1%)  0  (0.0%)  70  (2.1%) 
47.  Switzerland  40  (1.2%)  0  (0.0%)  40  (1.2%) 
48.  Taipei,China  8  (0.2%)  0  (0.0%)  8  (0.2%) 
49.  Thailand  26  (0.8%)  0  (0.0%)  26  (0.8%) 
50.  Turkey  2  (0.1%)  0  (0.0%)  2  (0.1%) 
51.  United Kingdom  366  (10.8%)  0  (0.0%)  366  (10.8%) 
52.  United States  235  (6.9%)  0  (0.0%)  235  (6.9%) 




2,789  (82.2%)  603  (17.8%)  3,392  (100.0%) 
Notes: * indicates the highest number or percentage in each column. Percentage in the sample is in parentheses. 




Table 4: Distribution of Sample Issuers by Year 
 
Year 
Frequency in the Sample 
(percentage of the sample) 
 
Subtotal/ 






317  (9.3%)  39  (1.1%)  356  (10.5%) 
1999 
 
368  (10.8%)  62  (1.8%)  430  (12.7%) 
2000 
 
447  (13.2%)  106  (3.1%)  553  (16.3%) 
2001 
 
485  (14.3%)  130  (3.8%)  615  (18.1%) 
2002 
 
576  (17.0%)  *133  *(3.9%)  709  (20.9%) 
2003 
 




2,789  (82.2%)  603  (17.8%)  3,392  (100.0%) 
Notes: * indicates the highest number or percentage in each column. 
Percentage in the sample is in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
4.2  Comparison of Solicited and Unsolicited Ratings 
The Mann-Whitney U-test and t-test results are reported in Table 5. Panels A and B in Table 
5 present the results of the overall sample with 3,392 ratings (Panel A) and the Japanese 
subsample with 798 ratings (Panel B). Japan was the only country with both solicited and 
unsolicited ratings during the study period. ADBI Working Paper 244    Poon and Chan 
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Table 5: Mann-Whitney U-test and t-test Results 
Panel A: Overall Sample from 53 Countries 
Subsample 
Number of 
Observations  Mean Rank  Sample Mean 
Solicited rating  2,789  1,770.87  6.10 
Unsolicited rating   603  1,352.50  5.59 
Difference     418.37  0.51 
Test Statistic:   
Z   9.78***   
t-test statistics    8.64***   
Panel B: Subsample from Japan with Both Solicited and Unsolicited Ratings 
Subsample 
Number of 
Observations  Mean Rank  Sample Mean 
Solicited rating  195  605.76  7.26 
Unsolicited rating  603  332.80  5.59 
Difference    272.96  1.67 
Test Statistic:   
Z    14.70***   
t-test statistics    19.16***   
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
All ratings are coded on a nine-point scale (from 9 to 1) where AAA = 9, AA = 8, A = 7, BBB = 6, BB = 5, B= 4, CCC = 
3, CC = 2, and SD/D = 1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The null hypothesis that unsolicited and solicited bank ratings have identical distributions 
(H1) can be rejected at the 1% level for both panels in Table 5. The mean rankings in both 
tables indicate that unsolicited ratings, on average, are lower than solicited ratings for the 
overall sample and for the Japanese subsample. 
 
4.3  Profiles of Firms  
Panels A and B of Table 6 present the descriptive statistics and the t-test and Z-test results 
of the two groups.
5
                                                 
5 Note that the Thomson Reuters Datastream does not have detailed reports for all sample firms with S&P LTRs. 
Also, there are missing data in Datastream, so the number of observations varies across financial variables. 
 Panel A shows the results of the overall sample while Panel B shows the 
results of the Japanese subsample. First, referring to the t-test and U-test results of the 
profitability ratios (see ratios ROC,  OM,  and  ROA), the solicited group had significantly 
higher profitability and earning power than the unsolicited group. Second, all debt ratios in 
the capital/debt structure group were significantly higher for the firms with unsolicited ratings. 
This suggests that unsolicited issuers had significantly higher leverage in terms of debt to ADBI Working Paper 244    Poon and Chan 
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capital  and  debt to total assets than those of the solicited issuers.  These results are 
consistent in both Panels A and B. 
Table 6 Panel A: Overall Sample 
Descriptive Statistics, t-test, and Mann-Whitney U-test Results 
of Financial Variables of the Sample Issuers 
 
  Solicited Rating  Unsolicited Rating   
t-value 
 
Z-value  Variable  Mean   Median  N  Mean  Median  N 
  Profitability 
  ROC   6.44   6.96  2,472   1.71   1.97   589   12.42 ***   19.68 *** 
  OM   6.85   9.59  2,510   5.60   4.36   589  0.45     14.28 *** 
  ROA   1.43   3.17  2,524   0.49   0.65   589   2.60 ***   14.55 *** 
  Capital/Debt Structure 
  DTC   49.52   45.28  2,518   59.36   64.18   589   (5.42) ***  (12.32) *** 
  DTA   35.37   32.60  2,522   42.39   43.50   589   (7.31) ***  (9.16) *** 
  LDTC   49.10   37.86  2,518   46.69   48.17   589  0.33     (7.07) *** 
  Cash Flow Protection 
  FFOTD   0.58   0.34  2,349   1.38   0.13   565   (0.81)    18.41 *** 
 NCFCAPEX   5.98   1.74  2,106   1.64   1.33   546  1.17    7.24 *** 
  Financial Flexibility 
  SDTD   26.08   20.09  2,487   45.99   44.81   585   (19.95) ***   (19.60) *** 
  CASHEQ   13.69   13.36  2,472   17.98   18.12   589   (57.53) ***   (30.17) *** 
  Liquidity 
  CR   1.48   1.14  2,513   1.15   0.98   589   2.26  **  6.63 *** 
  QUICK   1.07   0.77  2,508   0.76   0.59   589   2.14  **  8.91 *** 
  CASH   0.39   0.21  2,513   0.34   0.17   589   2.25  **  1.76  * 
  Size 
  TA   16.71   16.30  2,524   20.56   20.62   589   (60.27) ***   (30.03) *** 
  SALE   16.22   15.91  2,517   20.34   20.33   589   (64.77) ***   (30.72) *** 
  Other Variables 
  DTEBITDA   2.86   2.50  2,445   5.03   6.22   578  (1.20)     (14.97) *** 
  MTB  (0.24)   1.53  2,432   1.51   1.46   588  (0.66)     (0.84)   
  FIXTA   0.45   0.44  2,478   0.41   0.39   588   4.51 ***  3.97 *** 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Descriptive statistics include mean, median, standard deviation, and number of observations (N) of each variable. T-
values refer to the t-test statistics of the means between the solicited rating group and the unsolicited rating group, 
and Z-values refer to the Z-test statistics of the Mann-Whitney U between the solicited rating group and the 
unsolicited rating group. 
1. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
2. Note that the Thomson Reuters Datastream does not have detailed financial reports for all sample issuers with 
S&P LTRs. There are also missing data in Datastream for some variables, so the number of observations varies 
across financial variables. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6 Panel B: Subsample from Japan with Both Solicited and Unsolicited Ratings 
Descriptive Statistics, t-test and Mann-Whitney U-test Results  
of Financial Variables of the Sample Issuers 
 
 
  Solicited Rating  Unsolicited Rating   
t-value 
 
Z-value  Variable  Mean   Median  N  Mean  Median  N 
Profitability 
  ROC  3.16  3.01  183  1.71  1.97  589  4.09 ***  4.79 *** 
  OM  6.63  6.42  184  5.60  4.36  589  2.65 ***  3.93 *** 
  ROA  1.62  1.44  184  0.49  0.65  589  4.36 ***  5.34 *** 
Capital/Debt Structure 
  DTC  48.27  47.09  184  59.36  64.18  589  (5.16) ***  (5.15) *** 
  DTA  35.79  33.19  184  42.39  43.50  589  (3.74) ***  (3.79) *** 
  LDTC  39.66  35.04  184  46.69  48.17  589  (3.04) ***  (3.20) *** 
Cash Flow Protection 
  FFOTD  0.96  0.22  171  1.38  0.13  565  (0.40)    5.51 *** 
 NCFCAPEX  1.07  1.08  167  1.64  1.33  546  (5.29) ***  (4.55) *** 
Financial Flexibility 
  SDTD  37.70  36.98  183  45.99  44.81  585  (4.88) ***  (4.62) *** 
  CASHEQ  19.09  19.14  184  17.98  18.12  589  9.57 ***  9.04 *** 
Liquidity 
  CR  1.34  1.19  184  1.15  0.98  589  2.67 ***  3.93 *** 
  QUICK  0.89  0.81  184  0.76  0.59  589  2.54  **  4.43 *** 
  CASH  0.41  0.26  184  0.34  0.17  589  1.78  *  3.81 *** 
  Size 
  TA  21.70  21.67  184  20.56  20.62  589  11.98 ***  11.84 *** 
  SALE  21.48  21.48  184  20.34  20.33  589  12.02 ***  11.75 *** 
  Other Variables 
  DTEBITDA  1.28  3.08  178  5.03  6.22  578  (1.28)    (6.11) *** 
  MTB  1.89  1.70  185  1.51  1.46  588  0.92    2.93 *** 
  FIXTA  0.42  0.31  184  0.41  0.39  588  0.39    (1.27)   
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Descriptive statistics include mean, median, standard deviation, and number of observations (N) of each variable. T-
values refer to the t-test statistics of the means between the solicited rating group and the unsolicited rating group, 
and Z-values refer to the Z-test statistics of the Mann-Whitney U between the solicited rating group and the 
unsolicited rating group. 
1. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
2. Note that the Thomson Reuters Datastream does not have detailed financial reports for all sample issuers with 
S&P LTRs. There are also missing data in Datastream for some variables, so the number of observations varies 
across financial variables. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Third, the cash flow protection ratios (FFOTD and NCFCAPEX) show that the firms in the 
solicited group had more funds from operation (FFO) and net cash flow (NCF) compared to 
their total debt and capital expenditure than those in the unsolicited group in the overall 
sample.  On the other hand, the results of the Japanese subsample  indicate that the 
Japanese firms with unsolicited ratings had more NCF to payments to fixed assets than the 
Japanese firms with solicited ratings. 
Lastly, the comparisons of the three liquidity ratios (CR, QUICK, and CASH) illustrate that 
the issuers with solicited ratings were more liquid than the issuers with unsolicited ratings. In 
addition,  the  SDTD  ratio in the financial flexibility group indicates that the firms in the 
unsolicited group were tied up with more short-term debts compared to their total debts in ADBI Working Paper 244    Poon and Chan 
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both the overall sample and the Japanese subsample. However, the results of CASHEQ, 
TA, and SALE were mixed. The unsolicited group in the overall sample was significantly 
larger in asset size and sales revenues and had more cash than the solicited group, while 
the solicited group in the Japanese subsample  was larger and had more cash than the 
unsolicited group. 
In sum, the results indicate that those issuers with solicited ratings were more profitable and 
more liquid, and had lower leverage, than the issuers with unsolicited ratings. These results 
suggest that the solicited group had stronger financial profiles in terms of profitability, 
liquidity, and debt structure than the unsolicited group. Therefore, the null hypothesis of H2, 
that there is no difference in the financial profiles between the issuers with solicited and 
unsolicited ratings, can be rejected for the sample in this study. 
4.4  Results of Two-Step Treatment Effects Model 
We present the rating decision equation in Panel A of Table 7. Because there are 
disproportionately more Japanese companies in the sample, we used a dummy variable to 
control for the dominance of Japanese companies. We also separately estimated a Japan-
only subsample. The findings suggest that firm size (natural logarithm of total assets) and 
profitability (ROA) are positively related to the probability of seeking a credit rating while 
market-to-book ratio (MTB) and debt ratio (DTA) are negatively related to the probability. 
The signs of these variables are consistent with the literature. Both the full sample and the 
Japanese subsample offer similar results. 
Table 7: Result of the Treatment Effects Model Using Wooldridge’s Instrumental 
Variable Method 
Panel A: Rating Decision Equation (Model of the Probability of Being Rated) 
 
  Full sample (N = 2,765)  Japan only (N = 771) 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient   χ2 statistic  Coefficient   χ2 statistic 
 Intercept     45.6042   0.00      (15.9819)    109.00   *** 
 TA      0.7487   141.82 ***       0.7491    142.00   *** 
 FIXTA      0.2416   0.63        0.2403      0.62    
 SOV     (0.0082)   0.00       (0.0066)      0.02    
 ROA      0.1781   26.72 ***       0.1783     26.75   *** 
 MTB     (0.1255)   6.05 **      (0.1255)      6.05   ** 
 DTA     (0.0107)   6.81 ***      (0.0107)      6.76   *** 
 JAPAN  (61.6429)   0.00   —  —   
Log likelihood   (305.33)      (305.32)    
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Panel B: Rating Determinant Equation (Main Equation; Dependent Variable Is the 
Rating Level) 
 
  Full Sample (N = 2,407)  Japan Only (N = 635) 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient   t-statistics  Coefficient   t-statistics 
 Intercept  (2.0721)   -6.29 ***   1.1404   0.85  
 TA   0.1205   11.06 ***   0.1966   3.00 *** 
 SOV   0.5217   27.54 ***   0.0763   3.14 *** 
 ROA   0.0782   22.98 ***   0.1217   6.30 *** 
 DTA  (0.0242)  -21.16 ***  (0.0307)  -12.10 *** 
 FFOTD  (0.0061)   -1.26   (0.0077)   -0.43  
 Industry dummy (Oil and gas)   0.4806   4.41 ***  (0.5878)   -2.74 *** 
 Industry dummy (Basic materials)   0.2358   2.41 **  (0.0468)   -0.28  
 Industry dummy (Industrials)   0.1861   1.95 *  (0.4425)   -2.81 *** 
 Industry dummy (Consumer goods)   0.4253   4.31 ***  (0.1124)   -0.69  
 Industry dummy (Health care)   0.6030   4.69 ***   0.1082   0.53  
 Industry dummy (Consumer services)   0.3813   3.85 ***   0.2529   1.46  
 Industry dummy (Telecommunications)   0.7246   6.44 ***   0.8806   2.43 ** 
 Industry dummy (Utilities)   1.1240   10.41 ***   2.2142   10.17 *** 
 Y_HAT [Fitted probabilities of getting a 
rating (from Panel A results)]   1.9767   11.31 ***   1.1991   3.21 *** 
 JAPAN   1.1644   7.37 ***  —  —   
Adjusted R
2   0.5614      0.6486    
F-statistics  206.97***     84.59***    
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
For Panel A (rating decision equation), the seven explanatory variables of the probit model are (1) TA = natural 
logarithm of total assets, (2) FIXTA = fixed asset to total assets ratio, (3) SOV = sovereign credit rating where AAA = 
9, AA = 8, A = 7, BBB = 6, BB = 5, B= 4, CCC = 3, CC = 2, and SD/D = 1, (4) ROA = return on assets, (5) MTB = 
market-to-book ratio, (6) DTA = debt to total asset ratio, and (7) JAPAN = 1 if the company is based in Japan. 
For Panel B (rating determinant equation or main equation), the dependent variable of the primary regression 
equation of interest is the S&P long-term issuer credit rating where AAA = 9, AA = 8, A = 7, BBB = 6, BB = 5, B= 4, 
CCC = 3, CC = 2, and SD/D = 1. The explanatory variables include (1) TA, (2) SOV, (3) ROA, (4) DTA, (5) FFOTD = 
funds from operation to total debt, (6) various industry dummy variables, (7) JAPAN, and (8) Y_HAT = a fitted 
probability of the likelihood of a firm having solicited credit rating estimated from the probit model in Panel A. Y_HAT 
is an instrumental variable to Y in Equation (2). 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The findings of the determinants of credit ratings are presented in Panel B of Table 7. Both 
the full sample and the Japan subsample offer similar findings. The firm size (TA), sovereign 
risk (SOV), and profitability (ROA) are positively significant at the 1% level.  The results 
suggest that a larger and more profitable firm located in a country with a higher sovereign 
rating would get a higher LTR. The debt ratio is negatively significant at the 1% level. Other 
things being equal, a firm with higher leverage would have a lower LTR. The fit probability 
variable is positive and significant at the 1% level. Hence, there is indeed a sample-selection 
bias (i.e., a statistically significant Y_HAT variable). Therefore, we were able to reject H3 
(that corporate credit ratings do not reflect a sample-selection bias). In addition, a positively 
significant  Y_HAT  variable suggests that unsolicited firms exhibit a lower rating after 
controlling for other financial characteristics and sample-selection bias. There are a total of 
nine industries in our sample and we used the technology industry as the basis  for 
comparison. Many industry dummy variables are significant, which suggests that there are 
industry effects on credit ratings.  
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
We conducted a global study of the LTRs of nonfinancial firms as determined by S&P for the 
period 1998–2003. Specifically, we focused on the solicited versus unsolicited ratings and 
sample-selection bias in the analysis. Unlike the existing literature, we adopted an improved 
method using Wooldridge’s instrumental-variable approach to mitigate the concern of 
specification errors in Heckman’s model. We found that the probability of a firm seeking an 
LTR is positively related to the size and profitability of the firm, and negatively related to the 
growth opportunities and debt levels of the firm. The credit rating is positively related to the 
sovereign rating, size, and profitability of the issuer, and negatively related to the debt ratio 
of the issuer. 
Consistent with the existing literature, we found that there is indeed a sample-selection bias 
in credit ratings, i.e., the rating decision (the decision to seek an LTR) is not independent of 
the rating determinants decision. Our findings suggest that the firms with solicited ratings 
seem to be more profitable, more liquid, and have  lower leverage than the issuers with 
unsolicited ratings. After controlling for sample-selection bias and some key financial ratios, 
we found that unsolicited firms, on average, seem to have lower LTRs. The findings are 
consistent with the existing literature and are robust to the full sample and to a subsample of 
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